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THE QUEST FOR CLEAR LAND TITLES-
MAKING LAND TITLE SEARCHES SHORTER
AND SURER IN NORTH CAROLINA VIA
MARKETABLE TITLE LEGISLATION*
By JAmES A. WEBSTER, JR.t
There are voices crying in the wilderness of real property law
that there is a "crisis in conveyancing."1
In a jet age that utilizes "hot lines" in the hope of averting a
nuclear "hot war," perhaps the word "crisis" as related to land
transactions is a bit overdramatic. But one need only to broach the
subject of land-title searches to discover that non-ivory tower
lawyers of current vintage are disillusioned with the adequacy of
currently existing procedures for searching and certifying land
titles. In the quietude of their offices, while they are resting in
easy chairs away from the heavy, often dusty, giant grantor-grantee
indexes and the other bundlesome volumes necessary to be lifted
and opened in doing a thorough and painstaking title search, law-
yers will admit that problems so often written about by law pro-
fessors concerning real property are not merely hobgoblins of their
own imaginations but are real.2 Title lawyers will admit that they
* This article is the second of a projected series of articles on the im-
provement of land law. While the principal area of concern and emphasis
is on North Carolina law, it is the purpose of the articles to provide analyses
and approaches to solutions of problems of general application in other juris-
dictions. For the first article of the series, see Webster, The Quest for Clear
Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry?, 42
N.C.L. REv. 807 (1964).
f Professor of Law, Wake Forest College.
'E.g., Payne, The Crisis in Conveyancing, 19 Mo. L. REv. 214 (1954).
A number of other excellent articles have been written in recent years which
criticize present day conveyancing procedures and suggest conveyancing
reform. See Aigler, Title Problems in Land Transfers, 24 Micm. S.B.J.
202 (1945); Aigler, Clearance of Land Titles-A Statutory Step, 44 Micx.
L. REV. 45 (1945); Aigler, Marketable Title Acts, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47
(1958); Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47
IowA L. REV. 261 (1962); Cribbet, Conveyancing Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1291 (1960); Spies, A Critique of Conveyancing, 38 VA. L. REV. 245
(1952).
( One well-known title lawyer, when asked if he ever has any worry
concerning titles he has certified, admitted that it is not uncommon at all
for him to awake in the middle of the night and wonder whether he should
go to his office to check on a possible defect in a title certified for which he
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
go as far as is economically feasible in applying their labor, knowl-
edge of the law and their skill in ascertaining the status of a land
title. Many lawyers involved in title practice, however, will likewise
acknowledge that there are numerous potential problems that they
routinely ignore. Because of deficiencies in the existing system of
land recordation, coupled with certain idiosyncrasies of land law,
lawyers are forced "to make a choice between subjecting clients to
prohibitively large expenses or assuming the risk that the sleeping
dog will continue to lie.'"
3
The emphasis in this article is on record title deficiencies that
are not discoverable on a reasonably short title search. Every title
lawyer accepts the shortcomings of the records of land transactions
as positive indicia of sound titles. They know and advise their
purchaser and lender clients, hopefully, on the basis that the records
are no better than the subject of recordation. Though perfectly
recorded, if a deed has not been delivered, it conveys no title.' If a
deed has been delivered in blank to be filled in with the grantee's
name after the delivery, it is void and passes no title even though
recorded.5 Deeds from incompetents are not given validity by regis-
tration and remain void.' Deeds arising out of frauds in the factum,
perhaps as the result of forgeries, impersonations, or where there
is a want of identity or a disparity between an instrument executed
and one intended to be executed, cannot be said to be the deeds of
the makers at all.7 The marital status of a grantor may have been
incorrectly set out in a recorded deed because of a negligent
omission or by reason of a divorce and remarriage of a grantor in
another state or because of an initial secret marriage of the grantor.8
has made no allowance. He stated, however, that he had never gone to his
office in such instances.
'From a letter to the writer concerning the problems of title lawyers,
1964.
'McMahan v. Hensley, 178 N.C. 587, 101 S.E. 210 (1919).
Bank v. Wimbish, 192 N.C. 552, 135 S.E. 452 (1926).
'Thompson v. Thomas, 163 N.C. 500, 79 S.E. 896 (1913).
" "No title passes under such an instrument-it is void-and no rights
may be acquired thereunder even by innocent parties." Nixon v. Nixon,
260 N.C. 251, 257, 132 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1963). See Medlin v. Buford, 115
N.C. 260, 20 S.E. 463 (1894). See also, Parker v. Thomas, 192 N.C. 798,
136 S.E. 118 (1926) (for indicia of fraud in the factum as distinguished
from fraud in the treaty).
' Prior to the 1965 legislative session of the North Carolina General
Assembly, North Carolina law provided that a married woman could not
validly convey her real estate without the written assent of her husband.
Buford v. Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944). Pursuant to an
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That a grantor has been impersonated at some point in the execu-
tion of a deed in the chain of title, that there has been a forgery,
that the grantor was a minor, that there were undisclosed heirs of
a decedent in intestacy, or that a will in the chain of title was in-
effective because a testator married or had children born after the
will's execution will not appear except by laborious investigation
collateral to the land-title records. The existence of many ease-
ments, title in another as the result of adverse possession without
color of title, and potential mechanics' and materialmen's liens may
not be discovered even with the most exhaustive search. In short,
land-title records are no more than "some" evidence of the status
of the title to a particular tract of real property.'
amendment of N.C. CoNsT., art. X, § 6, approved by the people of the state
on January 14, 1964, the North Carolina General Assembly in 1965 passed
legislation designed to allow spouses, both wives and husbands, to contract
and deal with their respective real and personal property as if unmarried.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-1 to -2 (Supp. 1965). A word of caution is in
order concerning these statutes, however. While a husband's signature will
no longer be necessary to give his wife's deed legal vitality as formerly
required, the procuring of spouses' signatures on married grantors' deeds
will continue to be necessary. N.C. GEr. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1965) pro-
vides surviving spouses with a substitute for dower and curtesy. A sur-
viving spouse, notwithstanding the fact that his deceased spouse has made a
conveyance of his real property while living, may elect to take a life estate
in one-third in value of the deceased spouse's real property of which de-
ceased spouse was seized during coverture. There will be no waiver of the
surviving spouse's entitlement to the elective life estate provided by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1965) unless the surviving spouse has previously
joined the other spouse in his conveyance.
In addition, and of special interest to title searchers, N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 52-1 to -2 (Supp. 1965) have no retroactive effect. Deeds and conveyances
which were executed by married women prior to the effective date of the
new act without the written assent of their husbands have not been vali-
dated by the enactment of the new statutes. Questions relating to the marital
status of female grantors and to whether their proper husbands made written
assents to transfers of their lands before enactment of these statutes are
potentially capable of raising title and marketability problems for many years
to come.
"In simple truth the notion that we have anywhere in this country
(apart from the Torrens statutes) any such thing as "record title" is
sheer delusion. There are too many facts affecting the validity of a
title which not only do not appear in the records but which often cannot
be ascertained by any reasonable search outside the records . . . Among
the most frequently recurring items are: adverse possession and pre-
scriptions; forgeries and other frauds; matters of heirship, marriage
and divorce; copyists' and recorders' errors; infancy, insanity, and
other disabilities . . . identity of persons; invalidity of mortgage fore-
closures and of judgments and decrees; want of legal delivery of instru-
ments; violations of usury laws; unprobated wills, praetermitted heirs,
and posthumous children; falsity of affidavits; revocation of powers of
attorney by death or insanity; parol partitions and dedications; inchoate
19651
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Title lawyers, however, do not ordinarily purport to certify
"title"; they certify instead only "record title," carefully pointing
out that their certificates do not apply to any matters not appearing
in the public records; that the title to the land may be affected by
matters which do not appear of record and which are not covered
by the certificate of title.10 The title-searching attorney thus ef-
fectively, and perhaps necessarily, shifts the risk of loss by reason
of extrinsic facts to the purchaser or lender who has procured the
title search and certificate of title.
I. THE PROBLEM
But is the certificate of "record title" sufficient qua "record
title"? The layman client thinks it is; too many able lawyers think
it is. The lawyer who makes a routine title search establishes arbi-
trarily the date backward to which his search of the records will
be made." If the title searcher takes all reasonable precautions for
the period of time for which he elects to search the title according
to the custom prevailing in the area in which he practices and finds
mechanics' liens; extent of restrictive covenants; non-recordation of
prior government patent; and facts about boundaries. Such are some of
the hazards external to the records which may disturb the peace of the
faithful searcher for an indefeasible title. Obviously, for even the most
scant security he must go much beyond the official sources of informa-
tion. Often he does not go far enough.
McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE
L.J. 1125, 1128 (1939).
o. . .this certificate does not apply to any matters not appearing in the
public records of Blank County .... that the title to this property may
be affected by the following matters, among others, which do not appear
of record and which are not covered by this certificate: (a) claims, if
any, for labor or services performed or materials furnished in connection
with any construction or repairs to the property, and for which no notice
of lien has been filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court;
(b) unrecorded leases or rental agreements for three years or less re-
lating to the property; (c) rights of persons in possession of the property,
if any; (d) municipal zoning ordinances affecting the use of the property;
and (e) such facts as an accurate survey of the property by a regis-
tered engineer would reveal ....
Excerpt from a certificate of title given by a typical title lawyer in North
Carolina.
"Perhaps it is entirely unfair to state that the establishment of the
period of time that the title search is to encompass is arrived at arbitrarily
by lawyers. The period of time is related, no doubt, to economic feasibility
both in terms of dollars and cents and time expenditure. The routine title
search made in North Carolina usually covers a period of from twenty to
forty years. If the title is to be insured, minimum search of sixty years is
usually required.
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nothing defective in the record title for that period of time, he then
wades in with an air of fatalism and certifies "good record title.' 2
After taking all due precautions in checking a chain of title for
the maximum practicable period of time and applying his required
comprehensive knowledge of the substantive law of real property,
wills, trusts, mortgages, procedure, creditors' rights, equity, and
all of his analytical ability, and a scientific approach so far as pos-
sible, the title lawyer is relegated ultimately to the position of "clair-
voyant" or one who plays the "percentages," who exercises no more
than a "guess" or a "hunch" that a particular land title is good,
indefeasible, and marketable. On such slender assurance lifetime
savings are spent for the purchase of land for homes, farms, in-
dustry, and commerce.
Some hypothetical situations will illustrate that title searches
of the chain of record title for long periods of time backward give
no real assurance that a land title is clear of record defects, not to
mention the extra-record hazards previously set out.
For instance, assume the title to a specific piece of land is being
searched at the current date, 1965. Assume that the title attorney,
in order to ascertain the status of the title, searches back through
the grantor-grantee index books to determine the names of all
persons who have owned the land for the past forty years so that he
can establish the "chain of title." The title examiner will then
check all grants by way of deeds, mortgages, and deeds of trust
during the time that each owner in the chain of title held the land,
plus all recorded judgment liens, mechanics' and materialmen's
liens, tax and old-age assistance liens, assessments, the lunacy dock-
ets, and the lis pendens dockets for the period for which the title
search is made. If during the period for which he checks the land
title the lawyer finds no apparent defects in conveyances, acknowl-
edgments, contracts for the sale of land, deeds, mortgages, liens or
assessments, he will certify good "record title."
But the title-searching attorney is in difficulty if he makes only
a forty-year search of record in 1965 in the event of the existence
of any of the following interests under the following circumstances:
" A quaere sent to a number of North Carolina title lawyers indicates
an extreme uneasiness on the part of these lawyers generally in the ap-
praisal of the length of record title sufficient to show a marketable, insurable
or acceptable title. One correspondent indicated that in a particular title
search he was still uneasy after searching back for one hundred years.
1965]
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A. Ancient Contingent Remainders
Assume: In 1915 0 devised the land to X for life with a re-
remainder to X's children under O's will which was duly pro-
bated. Subsequent to 1915, X purported by a deed of conveyance
to convey the land to A in fee simple in 1920. A purported to
convey the land to B in fee simple in 1925; B purported to convey
the land to C in fee simple in 1935; C purported to convey to D
in 1945. In 1965, D wants to convey a fee simple to attorney's
client.
If X, the life tenant, is still living, which is not improbable at all,
a forty-year title search of the records will not disclose that D not
only does not have a marketable title, but that he does not have any
title at all! Nor will the statute of limitations aid the title-searching
attorney or his client to create title or rectify the defective title.
The adverse possession statute of limitations does not begin to run
against remaindermen and reversioners until the death of the life
tenant.13
B. Ancient Easements
Assume: In 1915 0 created an easement by reservation in a
tract of land which he conveyed to X in fee, such reservation of
easement being duly recorded in 1915. X and subsequent holders
of the land have conveyed the land several times without reference
to the 1915 reservation of easement. The current fee holder
wants to convey a fee simple title to attorney's client.
In the foregoing situation, a title search of forty years would
not necessarily disclose an existing servitude on the land. If the
easement has not been abandoned in fact or unless barred by pre-
scription, 4 the easement will continue to constitute an encumbrance
on the land, a "duly recorded" easement from 1915, and thus a
13 Sprinkle v. City of Reidsville, 235 N.C. 140, 69 S.E.2d 179 (1952);
Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950) ; Barnhardt v. Morrison,
178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919); Norcum v. Savage, 140 N.C. 472, 53 S.E.
289 (1906); Smith v. Proctor, 139 N.C. 314, 51 S.E. 889 (1905); Huneycutt
v. Brooks, 116 N.C. 788, 21 S.E. 558 (1895). See generally SImES & SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1962 (2d ed. 1956); BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITEs
55 (1953).
"It must be remembered, however, that mere non-user of an easement
by itself does not terminate an easement acquired under a written instru-
ment. Nor does the fact that the servient owner uses the land render his
user adverse to the easement holder. There must be an active interference
with the easement holder's use of the easement for the prescriptive period.
See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 8.102 (Casner ed. 1952); TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §§ 560-61 (abr. ed. 1940).
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part of the "record title" although not discoverable upon a reason-
able search of the title to the land for a forty-year period.
C. Ancient Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry
Assume: In 1865 a possibility of reverter or right of entry for
condition broken was created in a deed duly recorded at the date
of its execution which provided that the determinable fee or fee
simple on a condition subsequent would terminate or be termi-
nable upon the happening of some event in the future. Successive
transfers of the land have been made since the possibility of
reverter or right of entry were created without reference to the
terminating limitations or forefeiting conditions. The current
holder of the land wants to convey a fee simple title to attorney's
client.
The ancient future interests known as possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry may subsist for hundreds of years under current
law once they are placed on the land title records because the Rule
Against Perpetuities does not apply to them. 5 Once created and
placed on the land title records they become a part of the "record
title" which can endure for hundreds of years.1 6 If after their cre-
ation there are subsequent mesne conveyances which omit the for-
feiture or fee-terminating limitations or conditions, a title searcher
making even more than a routine title search for a certain number
of years backward never has any way of knowing whether he has
stopped "just short" of the link of title that would disclose the deed
containing a serious limitation or condition. A subsequent breach
of the condition by a purchaser, however innocently, could result
in the forfeiture of his estate. In addition, the title lawyer who
certifies title to his client (the purchaser) is never sure that suc-
ceeding title lawyers will not discover such condition or limitation
by going backward one further link, perhaps, and inform successive
prospective purchasers that there is no marketable title because of
the existence of the recorded ancient limitation or condition.
D. Ancient Mineral Rights
If land ownership is divided horizontally by a reservation or
grant of mineral rights in the land, serving the mineral estate from
1 SImES & SmITH, FUTURE INTERSTS, §§ 1238-39 (2d ed. 1956).
" Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of
Reverter and Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. REv. 807, 815-16 (1964).
1965]
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the surface estate, the minerals become a separate estate of in-
heritance.17 Thus a serious title-searching problem arises:
Assume: 0, in 1915, by recorded deed conveyed to X the min-
eral rights in a certain tract of land, and X and his successors
have since that time granted the land by fee simple deeds without
reference to the mineral deed. The current holder of the land
wants to convey a fee simple title to attorney's client.
Where land has been divided into surface and subsurface layers
of ownership in the distant past, it is obvious that this fact may not
be discovered on a routine search of title to the land. Once the
severance is made and duly recorded the existence of the mineral
rights in the land becomes a matter of perpetual record. They are
similar to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry with respect
to potential title-searching problems which they can cause. Even if
the outstanding mineral rights are discovered and even though
initially acquired only for speculative purposes, they can constitute
an effective clog on the marketability of the lands even after they
have become worthless.'8 The adverse possession statutes offer
little assistance in clearing land titles of old mineral deeds wherein
the ownership has been divided into surface and subsurface layers.
Once ownership of the minerals becomes separated from that of the
surface, mere subsequent possession by the surface owner will not
ripen into title to the mineral rights by adverse possession no matter
how long maintained. 9
7TIFrFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, § 585 (3d ed. 1939).1 8While North Carolina is not generally considered a mining state, a
number of title lawyers, in response to a questionnaire submitted to them,
answered that old mineral rights deeds cause a good deal of trouble in
certain widely dispersed areas of the state.
" Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d 117 (1943) ; Vance v. Pritchard,
213 N.C. 552, 197 S.E. 182 (1938); Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80
S.E. 249 (1913); TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 1158 (3d ed.
1939). See, however, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42 (1953) which provides
(where there has been at some previous time a separation between the
surface and subsurface rights) that a possessor of the surface of the land
may acquire title to the subsurface by adverse possession under limited
circumstances if he files a notice in the office of the register of deeds (1)
describing the property involved, (2) showing his intention to acquire the
mineral rights by a statement of the intended use of the land, (3) setting
forth the name and address of the claimant, (4) the date of commencement
of such use and (5) the deed or other instrument under which such claim
is made. While this statute could be revised in such a way as to be helpful
in extinguishing existing mineral rights where there has been a prior
separation of the surface and subsurface ownership and can provide record
evidence of a re-merger of the surface and subsurface titles, it would seem
[Vol. 44
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E. Miscellany-Ancient Options, Contracts, Defects in Execution
and Recordation; Ancient Equitable Servitudes
A myriad of other interests of record, recorded at some rela-
tively remote time may continue to be viable even though undis-
coverable by a search of recent records. Such interests may arise
under old options and contracts to purchase or repurchase or
may simply be a technical interest reposing in the heirs of a former
owner as is the case where there has been a negligent omission of a
seal on a deed.2" Or the chain of title as recorded may disclose a
defective acknowledgment or probate. A defective acknowledgment
or probate results in a defective recordation and will negate the
record title's efficacy as constructive notice to other purchasers for
value and creditors of the grantor whose instrument has been de-
fectively acknowledged or probated.2 Or an ancient equitable
servitude in the form of a restrictive covenant may have been
placed on land in a deed which was recorded at some remote time
in the past.
22
to be of little value under current law to assist title searchers because there
is no requirement for indexing under the names of grantors and grantees
sufficient to make it practically discoverable under ordinary existing pro-
cedures of title search since North Carolina does not employ the tract-indexing system. [Since this writing, § 1-42 has been amended. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-42 (Advance Leg. Serv. 1965). The 1965 General Assembly also
adopted § N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42.1 (Advance Leg. Serv. 1965), which
provides for extinguishment of ancient mineral claims. Ed.]
20 Strain v. Fitzgerald, 128 N.C. 396, 38 S.E. 929 (1901).
The registration of an improperly acknowledged or defectively pro-
bated deed does not import constructive notice and the deed will be treated
as unregistered. See, e.g., New Home Bldg. Supply Co. v. Nations, 259
N.C. 681, 131 S.E.2d 425 (1963); Allen v. Burch, 142 N.C. 524, 55 S.E.
354 (1906).
" While rights arising under options, contracts to purchase, defective
execution of instruments, improper recordation arising from faulty acknowl-
edgments and probate, or under ancient equitable servitudes may eventuate
in the vindication of a title via operation of statutes of limitation, estoppel,
waiver, substantial compliance, or changed circumstances, the fact is that
these defects often appear of record. If they are undiscovered by a prior
title-searching attorney, the prior attorney will be found to have certified a
title that is unmarketable in fact until the claims arising from the defects
or omissions are unequivocally cleared. Lawsuits declaring the termination
or nonexistence of the interests will be required, or it will be necessary toprocure deeds of release from all those ascertained or thought to have
interests. Usually, after passage of several years, a very large number of
persons must be located, served with process, or brought into negotiations.
For fear of what the next title searcher will discover, title lawyers are
under strong pressures to find all record title deficiencies each time a title is
searched. Paradoxically, minor impediments to marketability which might
otherwise be forgotten and pass out of existence are accentuated and con-
19651
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The point of all these hypothetical situations is to jolt any
lethargical thinking by title lawyers that "it can't happen to me" by
illustrating that any one or more of these events and interests could
exist in almost any title searched. After going back for a specified
predetermined period of time for his title search the title lawyer
speculates that "just over the horizon," just behind the last link in
his chain of title, there will be no recorded possibility of reverter,
right of entry for condition broken, remainder, reversion, power of
termination, easement, option to purchase or repurchase, equitable
servitude, notarial or probate error not erased by adverse possession.
If any one of these interests exists, it can cause the lawyer's client
to lose the land, result in a diminution of its value, or at best cost
his client the price of a quitclaim deed or a difficult-to-explain
lawsuit. Even if the defects or interests prove to be only nominal,
the wheels of progress in the closing of transactions and the de-
velopment of land are slowed and sometimes stopped altogether
while releases are being sought and lawsuits brought for the erasure
of such interests.
II. NEED FOR LEGISLATION
To protect lawyers and to make their title searches simpler and
shorter and at the same time more secure, legislation is needed in
the state of North Carolina which will make possible a complete
and accurate appraisal of the record titles of real estate by an exam-
ination of only the most recent history of the recorded titles.
Antiquated claims of interests in real property, such as possi-
bilities of reverter, rights of entry for condition broken, and other
non-possessory interests such as reversions, remainders, easements,
equitable servitudes, mineral rights, rights under options and con-
tracts for the sale and purchase of land, and claims arising out of
ancient clerical omissions and execution defects (such as the omis-
sion of a seal on a deed), should not be allowed to clog perpetually
the marketability of land. There should be some way to bar abso-
lutely or to extinguish all such claims and interests which have an
verted into serious impediments by increased diligence on the part of title-
searching attorneys. Many interests, ancient and forgotten by everyone until
discovered by some thorough attorney, may not ever become extinguished
so as to render the land marketable except by payment of exorbitant prices
in the form of legally sanctioned blackmail. See Webster, The Quest For
Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry?,
42 N.C.L. Rav. 807, 822 (1964).
[Vol. 44
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origin before some specified period of time prior to the time of the
title examination. So long as such interests as possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry for condition broken exist, no title searcher
is ever completely safe until he has made a title search back to the
sovereign.23 Some method is needed whereby ancient claims and
interests, however they may come into being, may be cleansed from
the record books periodically to facilitate the quest for clear land
titles and to promote the marketability of land in the event that
certain easy steps are not taken by their owners to preserve them
and keep them alive.
To solve the type problems that are set out above, in the past
twenty-odd years there have evolved comprehensive statutes in a
number of states24 called "marketable title statutes" which have as
their purpose the expediting and simplification of land transactions.
The purpose of this article from this point will be to make some
general observations and analyses with regard to marketable title
statutes, their concept, and their potential for alleviating the existing
23 Since the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to limit the dura-
tion of these interests, they may restrict land to uneconomic uses for hun-
dreds of years. For a 159-year-old example, consider the classic case of a
particular lot located in the heart of the Beacon Hill district on Mt. Vernon
Street in Boston, Massachusetts. In a conveyance of the lot in 1806, a
condition was set out that no building higher than thirteen feet could be
built on the lot. The condition is still in force and at 50-56 Mt. Vernon
Street, in the burgeoning metropolis that is Boston, there is still only a
thirteen-foot house. See Jefferies v. Jefferies, 117 Mass. 184 (1874). It has
been speculated that the purpose for the imposition of this restrictive con-
dition was to enable the owner of a building on the opposite side of the
street to keep her cattle in view as they grazed on the Boston Common.
LEACH & LOGAN, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING
58 n.24 (1961) [hereinafter cited as LEACH & LOGAN]; Leach, Perpetuities
In Real Estate: Let's Get The Rule On The Rails, A.B.A. Sec. of Real
Property, Prob. & Trust Law 20, 21 (1960). Ancient easements and
mineral rights may be equally encumbering. The same situations could all
exist in North Carolina today.
" Thirteen states now have marketable title statutes. BASYE, CLEARING
LAND TITLES, §§ 172-184 (Supp. 1964). The states, in order of their adop-
tion of the statutes are: Iowa, 1919, IowA CODE ANN. §§ 614.17-.20 (Supp.
1962); Illinois, 1941, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4 (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
1962) ; Indiana, 1941 (1941 act repealed in 1963. New act adopted in 1963),
see BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1101 to -1110 (Supp. 1964); Wisconsin,
1941, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 330.15 (1958); Minnesota, 1943, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1962); Michigan, 1945, MicEf. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-1271
to -1279 (1953); South Dakota, 1947, S.D. CODE §§ 51.16B01.-16B14 (Supp.
1960); Nebraska, 1947, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1958); North
Dakota, 1951, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); Ohio, 1961,
OHIo REV. CODE §§ 5301.47-.56 (Supp. 1960); Oklahoma, 1961, OKLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 71-81 (Supp. 1964); Florida, 1963, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 712.01-.10
(Supp. 1963) ; Utah, 1963, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to -10 (1953).
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problems in real estate conveyancing which have been previously
considered. Finally, a proposed statute for North Carolina will be
set out with specific comments on the purposes of its various sections.
III. GENERAL CONCEPT OF MARKETABLE TITLE LEGISLATION
The concept of the various types of marketable title legislation
adopted by the several states referred to above is not complicated.
The acts in the main are based on the proposition that if a person
has a clear chain of record title which goes back for a specified
number of years 2 5 and no one has filed a notice of a claim or in-
terest in the land during a specified period, then it is the purpose of
the acts that all conflicting and inconsistent claims or interests
based upon any title transaction prior to the terminal date of such
specified period shall be automatically extinguished. This purpose
is sought to be accomplished by combining the collective sanctions
of "curative acts," "the recording acts," and "statutes of limita-
tions" all into one act.
26
Many defects in marketability of land arise as a result of defects
in the execution of deeds of conveyance, such as omissions of
seals,2 7 spouses' signatures,2 8 required procedures for conveyances
2r Basye, Trends And Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IowA L.
R'EV. 261, 267 (1962) : "When one person has a clear record title to land
for a designated period (periods in the acts vary from twenty to fifty years),
inconsistent claims or interests which arose before that period are extin-
guished unless the adverse claimant seasonably records a notice of his claim
or interest."
" See the excellent case of Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 106-07,
83 N.W.2d 800, 816 (1957) which states:
The Marketable Title Act is a comprehensive plan for reform in convey-
ancing procedures and encompasses within its provisions the collective
sanction of (a) a curative act, (b) a recording act, and (c) a statute of
limitations. It is a curative act in that it may operate to correct certain
defects which have arisen in the execution of instruments in the chain
of title. It is a recording act in that it requires notice to be given to
the public of the existence of conditions and restrictions, which may be
vested or contingent, growing out of ancient records which fetter the
marketability of title .. .. It is as well a statute of limitations in that
the filing of a notice is a prerequisite to preserve a right of action to
enforce any right, claim, or interest in real estate founded upon any
instrument, event, or transaction which was executed or occurred more
than 40 years prior to the commencement of the action, whether such
claim or interest is mature or immature and whether it is vested or con-
tingent.
'" "A paper in form a deed is not a deed without a seal." Strain v. Fitz-
gerald, 128 N.C. 396, 398, 38 S.E. 929 (1901).
"See note 8 supra.
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between spouses,2" or other negligent omissions. While these de-
fects in most cases are merely technical and are readily rectifiable if
discovered promptly, they often loom larger and become serious
problems with the passage of time because of the mobility of grantors
or their subsequent disability, or as a result of the grantors' deaths
leaving strangers to the defective transactions on the scene to be
dealt with. The "curative" aspect of marketable title acts render
ancient technical imperfections of no importance and erase them
after passage of a specified period of time.
Other problems of marketability arise because of the existing
theories of land-recordation acts. The land-recordation acts are
too all-inclusive in reaching too far backward. Once interests in
land are put on record, including not only fee simple ownership but
also the vast array of non-possessory future interests, easements,
mineral rights, equitable servitudes, leases, mortgages, and inter-
ests arising from defective execution and probate, they are pre-
served there in the records forever, and the interests of good faith
transferees of the land are thereafter subordinated to ancient claims
which might otherwise be forgotten. In other words, once an in-
terest is placed on the books in the register's office, there is no
existing method to cleanse the records periodically of the barnacles
of antiquated interests, however obsolete. When the recordation
statutes, which serve to preserve claims of interest for eternity once
recorded, are combined with substantive real property rules that
allow certain non-possessory interests to hang suspended for gen-
erations,3" the burdens cast on the title searcher to locate such in-
terests become increasingly impractical with the passage of time and
with each transfer of the land. And if a title searcher is fortunate
(or unfortunate?) enough to discover a seventy-five-year-old possi-
bility of reverter, right of entry or easement, how is he to clear the
land title if employed to do so by a prospective seller or purchaser? A
" See note 8 supra. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965), which was
formerly N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (Supp. 1963), specifies that no convey-
ance by a married woman to her husband shall be valid unless the wife is
privately examined by a justice of the Supreme Court, a judge of the
superior court, a clerk, assistant clerk or deputy clerk, justice of the peace
or magistrate and unless such officer certifies that the transaction is not
unreasonable or injurious to the wife. See Walston v. Atlantic Christian
College, 258 N.C. 130, 128 S.E.2d 134 (1962).
"'E.g., possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken
which are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. See Webster, The
Quest For Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter and Rights
of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. Rxv. 807, 815 (1964).
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lawsuit to quiet title will probably serve only to prove the con-
tinued existence of such outstanding interest, assuming the diffi-
culties of service of process for bringing the suit and binding all
parties of interest can be overcome. Nor will negotiations for
purchase of such nominal interests be any easier because of the likeli-
hood of the fractionization of such ancient interests by descent
over the years and the necessity for dealing with numerous heirs.
The haunting question of whether the interests of all persons have
been pre-empted always arises.
The recordation acts need to be revitalized by a provision that
will cleanse record titles of ancient interests unless claims to pre-
serve such interests are re-recorded periodically.8 ' Without such
cleansing, a title searcher cannot ever be sure that there is not an
outstanding anciently recorded interest unless he searches the whole
title to the land involved throughout its entire recorded history.
The marketable title acts seek to incorporate the concept behind
all recordation statutes in requiring periodic re-recordation of cer-
tain interests in land that otherwise would not be discoverable on
a reasonable search backward in the land-title books. If not re-
recorded within a certain time as specified in the statutes a previous
recordation of such interests gives no notice to purchasers for value
or lien creditors who can take free of such claims.
In addition, the marketable title statutes serve as a form of statute
of limitations when they prescribe that the filing of a notice to
preserve a claim within specified time limits is a prerequisite to the
continued existence of rights, claims of interests in real estate
founded upon instruments, and events or transactions which were
executed or which occurred more than a specified number of years
prior to a title search. Whether just or unjust, whether mature or
immature, vested or contingent, and even though previously re-
corded in the land-title record books, non-possessory interests in
land will be made to pass out of existence after expiration of the
specified period of time unless re-recorded as provided in the statutes.
With these concepts in mind, a proposed marketable title statute,
with comments, is set out below for consideration by members of
" In a 1956 report the Judicial Council of Massachusetts observed:
"Today, after 300 years the need of re-recording of evidence to bring the
document within the reach of a reasonable period of search is like the orig-
inal need of recording." REPORT OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHU-
SETTS, IMPROVING OUR LAND TITLE RECORDING SysTEm 20, 22 (32d Rep.
1956).
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the North Carolina bar and by the General Assembly of North
Carolina. 2
IV. PROPOSED MARKETABLE TITLE ACT FOR THE STATE
OF NORTH CAROLINA
Section 1. Declaration of Policy and Statement of Purpose.-
It is hereby declared as a matter of public policy by the General
Assembly of the State of North Carolina:
(a) That land is the basic resource of the people of the State of
North Carolina and that land should be made freely alienable
and marketable so far as is practicable;
(b) That anciently created non-possessory interests in land,
obsolete restrictions and technical defects in titles which have
been placed on the land-title records at remote times in the
past often constitute unreasonable restraints on the aliena-
tion and marketability of land;
(c) That such interests and defects are prolific producers of
suits to clear and quiet titles which necessitate delays in
land transactions and fetter the marketability of real estate;
(d) That land transfers should be accomplishable with economy
and expediency and that the status and security of recorded
land titles should be determinable from an examination of
recent records only.
Now, therefore, it is the purpose of the General Assembly
of the State of North Carolina to provide that if a person claims
title to land under a chain of record title for thirty years, and no
one else has filed a notice of his claim of interest in the land
during the thirty-year period, then all conflicting claims based
upon any title transaction prior to the thirty-year period shall be
deemed extinguished.
While the statement of policy and purpose is not absolutely
necessary to a marketable title statute, it is suggested for inclusion
for what is conceived to be a salutary function. The statement of
policy and purpose can reflect and announce the legislature's apprais-
al of the existing problems and its attempt to exercise its police
power in a reasonable way for the public good., If needed, the
" This proposed act is taken largely from the Michigan Marketable
Title Act and the Model Marketable Title Act published in SimES & TAYLOR,
THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 341 (1960) [here-
inafter cited as SIMES & TAYLOR]. The late Professor Ralph W. Aigler of
the University of Michigan was the chief architect and draftsman of
Michigan's Marketable Title Act.
" See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 121, 83 N.W.2d 800, 825
(1957):
These statutes reflect the appraisal of state legislatures of the "ac-
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statement of policy and purpose can bolster judicial opinions that
the legislative action taken is constitutional. 4
A. Marketable Title Defined
Section 2. Marketable record title to interest in land; thirty-
year unbroken chain of title of record; effect of hostile possession
by another.-Any person having the legal capacity to own land
in this state, who, alone or together with his predecessors in title,
has been vested with any estate in land of record for thirty years
or more, shall have a marketable record title to such estate in
said land, which shall be free and clear of all claims except the
matters set forth in section 3. A person shall have a marketable
title when the public records disclose a title transaction affecting
the title to the land which has been of record for not less than
thirty years purporting to create such estate either in:
The person claiming such estate; or
Some other person from whom, by one or more title trans-
actions, such estate has passed to the person claiming such estate,
with nothing appearing of record, in either case, purporting to
divest such claimant of the estate claimed.
The first mission of a marketable title statute is to make land
titles more marketable. As a by-product, title lawyers should be
freed from all reasonable doubts that land titles which they have
searched are clear of interests which may unnecessarily clog the
free alienability of land.35 The second section of the proposed
tual economic significance of these interests, weighed against the incon-
venience and expense caused by their continued existence for unlimited
periods of time without regard to altered circumstances." Trustees of
Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 492, 130 N.E.2d 111, 115 (1955); see
43 Ill. L. REV. 90 (1948). They must be construed in the light of the
public good in terms of more secure land transactions which outweighs
the burden and risk imposed upon owners of old outstanding rights to
record their interests.
Compare LEACH & LOGAN 75 n.45.
" That the police power extends not only to regulations designed to
promote the public health, public morals, and public safety, but also to
those regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general
prosperity, see Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin, 199 N.C. 83, 154 S.E.
29 (1930); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 155 N.C. 356, 71 S.E.
514 (1911), aff'd 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
" Preparatory to writing this article a copy for a questionnaire pre-
pared for the Committee on Research Projects for the Improvement of
Conveyancing, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American
Bar Association, entitled "Survey of Hazards in Conveyancing Practice"
was procured from Professor Paul E. Bayse, chairman of that committee
and circulated to a large number of lawyers engaged to a substantial extent
in land title practice in North Carolina. Seventy-five per cent of the title
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statute, therefore, sets out in affirmative fashion what will consti-
tute a marketable title in North Carolina. This section can limit the
scope of "reasonable doubt" as to whether a title is marketable or
not.36 Under the existing recordation system and current practices
it is not safe for a title lawyer to ignore any defect in title, even
if it is insubstantial and not likely to be successfully sustained in
court. A title lawyer has good reason to have a cautious fear that
some other lawyer will raise the question of the defect and refuse
to allow his client, a potential subsequent purchaser or lender, to
buy or lend on the real property until every defect has been removed
and corrected. There needs to be a positive definition of marketable
title so as to reduce defects inherent and perpetuated in the currently
existing recording system. At the same time the definition of
marketability can standardize the criteria for determining whether
a title is clear enough to lend money on or to buy." While prudent
caution and meticulousness can never be dispensed with in title
practice, their necessity can be confined to the more serious and more
recent defects by adequately defining what constitutes marketable
title.
If the statute is enacted, a lawyer will need only search the title
of a grantor and his predecessors backward for the specified period of
time (thirty years). If he finds no defects, no "out" conveyances,
lawyers who answered the questionnaire indicated that the most serious
inadequacy of North Carolina's title security and title assurance methods is
that owners have difficulty in selling and encumbering real property, the
title of which is sound but which is defective or imperfect of record. For
the results of this questionnaire which was sent to lawyers engaged in
conveyancing practice in six states other than North Carolina, see SimEs &
TAYLOR 402-405.
" See Aigler, Marketable Title Acts, 13 U. MIAMI L. REv. 47, 50 (1958)
in which the principal author of Michigan's pioneering marketable title
act states:
[P]rudent examiners base their opinion and advice not upon what they
feel sure would be a judgment of a court, but upon what they fear might
be the advice of a later captious and capricious lawyer. In other words,
the yardstick according to which the title examiner tests the title in
question is not the judgment of a presumably reasonable and intelligent
court, but the caprice of a later unreasonable examiner, thus making
fly speckers of all of us! This accentuates the cumbersome qualities of
our title system and also adds to the delays and expense.
"' In the questionnaire sent to North Carolina title lawyers (see note 35
supra), 70% of the lawyers who answered stated that they regard the
burden of appraising the length of record title necessary to show a market-
able, insurable, or acceptable title and the lack of a uniform or generally
accepted notion as to the standards of acceptable titles to be major defi-
ciencies in the conveyancing and title system of North Carolina.
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liens, encumbrances or outstanding interests which appear in the
records for that period of time, the lawyer in most instances can be
assured that questions concerning outstanding pre-existing interests
or defects in the execution of instruments will never be raised by
even the most timid subsequent title searcher." The statute can
effectively reduce the array of potential claims and interests that can
exist after the expiration of the specified period from the time of
their creation.3 Not only will the search of land titles be expedited,
but more secure titles will be obtained by the purchasing and lending
public. An economy of time and risk for the lawyer can be realized
with a concurrent improvement of the job done.
B. Exemptions From Act
A section setting forth exemptions from the act, situations in
which interests in land are not extinguished, is provided in the act:
Section 3. Exemptions.-Such marketable record title shall not
affect or extinguish the following rights:
(a) Estates or interests, easement and use restrictions disclosed
by and defects inherent in the muniments of title of which
such thirty-year chain of record title is formed, provided,
however, that a general reference in any of such muniments
to easements, use restrictions or other interests created
prior to such thirty-year period shall not be sufficient to
preserve them unless specific identification by reference to
book and page of record be made therein to a recorded title
transaction which imposed, transferred or continued such
easement, use restrictions or other interests.
(b) Estates or interests preserved by the filing of a proper notice
in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 herein.
(c) Rights of any person who is in present, actual and open
possession of the lands so long as such person is in such
possession.
(d) Rights of any person who likewise has a marketable title as
defined in section 2 hereinabove and who is listed as the
owner of such lands on the tax books of the county in which
the lands are located at the time that marketability is to be
established.
L3 At least all title searchers, including "fly speckers," will be operating
under the same standardized ground rules.
" A caveat should be noted, however. State legislation cannot limit the
property rights of the United States Government. Therefore it will con-
tinue to be necessary to check back more than the prescribed period to dis-
cover ancient limited United States Government interests of record. Some
federal legislation is also needed.
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(e) Rights of any person who has an easement or interest in the
nature of an easement the existence of which is clearly ob-
servable by physical evidences of its use.
(f) Rights, titles or interests of the United States.
One of the most critical sections of the proposed marketable
title statute is the "exemptions" section. If too many exemptions
are put into the statute, effective accomplishment of the purposes of
the act may be curtailed. The number of exceptions from application
of the act must be kept to a bare minimum if reasonably short land-
title searches are to be made practicable and if land titles are to be
stabilized. The proposed statute follows this principle.
Subsection (a) of the exemption section is not really an exemp-
tion or exception. It merely states that estates, interests, easements
or restrictions which appear within the instruments located upon a
search of title for thirty years shall not be affected or extinguished
by reason of the act. In addition, since it will be rare indeed that a
title search backward for the prescribed period can terminate at a
transaction which occurred exactly thirty years prior to the title
search, the title searcher will be compelled to go backward to the
transaction next preceding the thirty-year period. In such event if
a muniment of title, necessarily discovered to complete the chain of
title for such thirty-year period, discloses an estate, interest, ease-
ment, or restriction, it shall not be affected or extinguished.4 0 A
proviso is added to eliminate uncertainties which may be caused by
general references to prior instruments by muniments in the chain
of title discoverable on a search for the prescribed period. The
proviso requires specific identification by book and page number of
the "recorded title transaction which imposed, transferred or con-
tinued such easement, use restrictions or other interests."
Subsection (b) of the exemptions section simply excepts from
"°E.g., suppose a deed recorded in 1920 would show that A conveyed
land to B in fee simple "so long as the land is used for residential purposes
only." A possibility of reverter was created in A and appears of record.
If no instrument affecting the title has been subsequently recorded and in
1965 B wishes to sell the land, the title of B can only be determined by a
forty-five-year title search to the next preceding title transaction which is
required to make out a chain of title for at least thirty years. A's possi-
bility of reverter is an "interest inherent in the muniments of title of which
such thirty-year chain of title is formed" and would not be affected or ex-
tinguished. Any interest found in a muniment of title necessarily discovered
in making out the thirty-year chain of title will not be affected or extin-
guished by the act. See SIMEs & TAYLOR 12.
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extinguishment estates or interests in land that are re-recorded pur-
suant to section 4 of the proposed statute.41
Subsection (c) of the exemptions section of the proposed statute
is designed to assure that the rights of persons in actual possession
of land shall not be affected or extinguished by a declaration of a
marketable record title in another. It will be applicable in the fol-
lowing types of situations:
1. Adverse Possession Situation.-Where one has obtained title
to land by adverse possession and is in "present, actual and open
possession" of the land, whether his title has matured before or
after the maturing of the marketable record title, his title by adverse
possession shall not be extinguished. So long as one is in present,
actual and open possession of the land, his rights in the land, what-
ever they are, will not be extinguished by reason of the other pro-
visions of the proposed act.4" If an adverse possessor's title has
matured, but subsequent to its maturity the adverse possessor shall
have left possession of the land and is not in possession of the land
at the time marketability is to be established, then such title by ad-
verse possession will be wiped out just like any other title which
arises from a "title transaction" which shall have occurred more
than thirty years prior to the date when marketability is sought
to be established. 3
2. "'Wild Deed" Situation.-In the rare instances where there
are two independent chains of title, resulting from the existence of
a "wild deed," there can be two marketable record titles at one time
unless some exception is imposed. 4   A hypothetical example will
illustrate this:
" If a proper notice is filed to preserve any estate or interest in land
in the same manner as deeds are recorded, it shall have the effect of pre-
serving such estate or interest for a period of not longer than thirty years.
"' This exemption should apply equally to the rights of a tenant under
a short term unrecorded lease who is in possession of the land. (In North
Carolina leases for three years or less are valid although oral and need not
be recorded as against purchasers for value or lien creditors under the
recordation statutes.) Leases which run for more than three years from the
time of the making thereof must be in writing to be valid in North Carolina.
Leases for more than three years must likewise be duly recorded to effect
priority over purchasers for value and lien creditors. N.C. GENl. STAT. §§
22-2, 47-18; Mauney v. Norvell, 179 N.C. 628, 103 S.E. 372 (1920).
"See definition of "title transaction" on page 121 infra.
"There could in fact be several marketable record titles if there were
several independent chains!
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Assume: 0 (owner) deeded land to A in 1915, which deed
was duly recorded in 1915. A took possession and remains
in possession of the land in 1965. Suppose that in 1925, by a
totally "wild deed" having no connection with title to the land,
X purported to convey the same land to Y, which deed from X
to Y was duly recorded in 1925.
A will have muniments of title of record going back for fifty years.
He would therefore have a marketable record title under the second
sentence of section 2 of the proposed act. Y will likewise have
muniments of record title which date back forty years and will also
have a marketable record title under the second sentence of section
2 of the proposed act unless some exception is made. Thus, under
the conventional "grantor-grantee" type indexing and recordation
system the paths of title searchers checking the marketability of the
respective record titles offered by A and Y, which are completely
independent, would not cross-neither would be able to locate the
other chain of title from the indexes through an orthodox title
search. 5 To obviate this problem subsection 3 of the exemptive
provision preserves from extinction the rights of the holder of the
marketable record title who is in possession of the land as against
a holder of an otherwise marketable record title (as defined in sec-
tion 2) under a "wild deed" who is not in possession.
It should be noted that in the foregoing instance the fact of
possession at the time marketability is to be established will be
significant. This is the one place in the proposed statute which re-
quires that matters extrinsic to the public records be considered.
Before a lawyer can certify a land title to be marketable in fact with
" The solution of this and other problems has been suggested by the
introduction of tract indexing. Indexes relating land transaction instru-
ments to particular tracts of land rather than to grantors and grantees are
being advocated by some legal scholars. See, e.g., Spies, A Critique of
Conveyancing, 38 VA. L. RFv. 245, 253 (1952); Cross, The Record "Chain
of Title" Hypocrisy, 57 CoLum. L. Rxv. 787 (1957); Cook & Lomberdi,
American Land Law Reform: Modernization of Recording Statutes, 13
W. REs. L. REv. 639 (1962). If a system of tract indexing were in force
every transaction, however "wild," relating to a particular tract or lot of
land would appear on the index to that particular tract of land, usually on
one page. With modern aerial photographic methods and mapping techniques,
many of which are already employed by land use planning and taxing
authorities, perhaps serious consideration should be given to introduction
of the tract-indexing system, at least for the purpose of accompanying the
present grantor-grantee system. The proposed marketable title statute,
however, is designed to be effective even without any reformation of the
recording system to the tract-indexing system.
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complete safety, to pre-empt the possibility of the existence of a
"wild marketable record title" he will have to make inquiry as to
the status of possession of the land. If one is in possession other
than the person offering to sell or convey the land, his rights, if
any, must be examined. While the general concept and purpose
of the proposed marketable title statute is to give emphasis to
"record" title, in this one instance inquiry into the present, actual
and open possession of the land is necessary. This requirement will
not materially diminish the utility of the proposed legislation. One
who has a marketable record title to land for thirty years with
nothing appearing of record purporting to divest him of his title
will continue to have a marketable record title in fact, even with
the presence of subsection (c) of the exemptions section of the
statute, unless two relatively rare coincidences occur: (1) there must
be another claimant under an independent chain of title, and (2)
such other claimant under the "wild record chain of title" must be
in possession of the land at the time that its marketability is to be
determined. Requiring inquiry into possession to protect against
the possibility of these rare circumstances which may affect market-
ability does not seem unduly inconvenient to title searchers.
Subsection (d) of the exemptions section is also designed to
apply to the theoretically worrisome, though rarely occurring,
problem of the "wild deed." This particular provision is designed to
protect from extinguishment the interests of an owner of a market-
able record title from a "late squatting possessor"4" who, by reason
of a "wild deed," also has a marketable record title under section 2
of the proposed statute which defines marketable record title only in
terms of a record chain of title. Section 2 of the proposed statute
alone does not require one to have possession to have marketable
record title. A hypothetical situation will demonstrate the possible
need for an exemptive provision such as the proposed subsection (d):
Assume that 0 (owner) deeded lands to A in 1915, which deed
was duly recorded in 1915. A took possession of the lands and
remained there for fifty years to 1965. In 1965, A left possession
of the lands and they are now vacant. Assume that in 1925, by
a "wild deed" having no connection with the true title of the land
X purported to convey the lands to Y by a deed which was duly
"' The description "late squatting possessor" was invented by Boyer
& Shapo, Florida's Marketable Title Act: Prospects and Problems, 18 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 103, 118 (1963).
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recorded in 1925. When A left possession of the lands in 1965,
Y went into possession and is now in possession.
Again, unless there is some provision such as subsection (d)
of the exemptions section, both A and Y would have marketabl6
record titles under section 2 of the proposed statute. Subsection (d)
is designed to protect the holder of a good marketable title who
leaves actual possession of his land temporarily. It prevents the
extinguishment of a good marketable record title by a "late squatting
possessor" under a "wild marketable record title" who may ease
into possession when the true owner leaves the land vacant. If the
true owner of land having marketable record title is listed as owner
on the tax assessment books in the county where the land lies for
tax purposes, a possessor of the land under a "wild" chain of title
cannot give a marketable record title to the land. The result is
that attorneys checking titles will be put on guard that a title may
not be completely marketable even though the prospective seller
or borrower is in possession of the land if the land is listed for
taxation by some other person at the time that marketability is to be
determined."'
Subsection (d) of the exemptions section preserves from opera-
tion of the title-extinguishing features of the statute easements and
interests in the nature of easements if they are clearly observable
by physical evidences of their use. The purpose of this provision is
to prevent the extinguishment of interests, many of which may
not be recordable but the existence of which are clearly discernible by
observation. Easements actually being used-such as those created
by deed, dedication, prescription, implication, condemnation, or as
a result of cartway proceedings-would be excepted from any
destruction under the proposed statute under this subsection if
visible and apparent from their use. If an easement or interest is
not "observable by physical evidences of its use," however, it will
pass out of existence if not re-recorded as provided by the statute.
This exception is placed in the statute because it is felt that most
persons would find undesirable any attempt to extinguish easements
or interests such as rights-of-way in actual observable use by ap-
" The necessity imposed for searching the tax books to determine the
marketability of land titles is not new. See Fulton, Title Examination In
North Carolina, Part II, 9 BAR NoTm, N.C.B.A. 3, 13 (1958).
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plication of the marketable title act. This proposed provision is
consciously designed not to except easements, rights-of-way, or
other servitudes owned by governmental agencies and public utilities
as the legislation of some states has done." If too many interests
are exempted from its application, the highly useful purpose of the
statute to provide a reliable marketable title by a search of recent
records only will be frustrated.
Subsection (f) of the exemptions section exempts rights, titles,
or interests of the United States from the proposed statute's appli-
cation since such interests cannot be affected by state legislation,
whether expressly exempted or not."9
It should be noted, however, that it is the intent of the proposed
statute that state interests should not be exempted from the legis-
lation. If the purpose of the statute to make land more easily
marketable is meritorious, then the state, of all persons and legal
entities, should not wish to frustrate the purposes and policy of the
statute. Exceptions in a marketable title statute are generally un-
" See, e.g., Michigan's statute, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1274 (1953)
which states: "Nor shall this act be deemed to affect any right, title or
interest in land owned by the United States, nor any right, title or interest
in any land owned by the State of Michigan, or by any department, com-
mission or political subdivision thereof." Florida's statute, FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 712.03(5) (Supp. 1963) provides:
Recorded or unrecorded easements or rights, interest or servitude in
the nature of easements, rights-of-way and terminal facilities, including
those of a public utility or of a governmental agency, so long as the same
are used and the use of any part thereof shall except from the operation
hereof the right to the entire use thereof.
Ohio's statute, OHIO REV. CoDE § 5301.53 (Supp. 1964), excepts
(B) . . . any easement or interest in the nature of an easement created
or held for any railroad or public utility purpose;
(D) . . . any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, or any
rights granted, excepted, or reserved by the instrument creating such
easement or interest, including any rights for future use, if the existence
of such easement or interest is evidenced by the location beneath, upon,
or above any part of the land described in such instrument of any pipe,
valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, pole, tower, or other
physical facility and whether or not the existence of such facility is
observable.
(E) . . . any right, title, estate, or interest in and to minerals, and any
mining or other rights appurtenant thereto or exerciseable in connection
therewith.
(Emphasis added.)
0 It has been suggested that it may be possible to obtain desirable federal
legislation which will subject the United States government interests to
state marketable title legislation. See, e.g., Payne, The Crisis in Convey-
ancing, 19 Mo. L. REV. 214, 231 (1954); 47 IowA L. REV. 389, 395 (1962).
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desirable and should be eliminated or at least kept to a minimum
if the proposed act is to accomplish its objectives.
C. Preserving Interests Worth Keeping-Re-recordation
Section 4. Interests extinguished by marketable record title unless
written notice to preserve claim is filed within thirty-year period;
who may file notice to preserve claim.-Subject to the matters
stated in section 3, such marketable record title shall be free and
clear of all estates, interests, claims or charges whatsoever, the
existence of which depends upon any act, title transaction, event
or omission that occurred prior to such thirty-year period. All
such estates, interests, claims or charges, however denominated,
whether such estates, interests, claims or charges are or appear to
be held or asserted by a person sui juris or under a disability,
whether such person is natural or corporate, or is private or gov-.
ernmental, are hereby declared to be null and void; provided,
however, that any person claiming any such interest in land may
preserve and protect the same from extinguishment by the opera-
tion of this act by filing for record within such thirty-year period a
notice in writing, duly acknowledged, in the office of the register
of deeds for the county in which the land is situated, setting forth
the nature of such claim of interest, which notice shall have the
effect of preserving such claim of interest for a period of not
longer than thirty years after filing the same unless again filed as
required herein. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind
on the part of any person shall delay the commencement of or
suspend the running of said thirty-year period. Such notice may
be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting
on behalf of any claimant who is
(a) Under a disability;
(b) Unable to assert a claim on his behalf; or
(c) One of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or
is uncertain at the time of filing such notice of claim for
record.
Section 4 of the proposed statute contains perhaps the most
interesting innovation of the entire proposed act. While market-
ability and relatively easy and accurate title searches are much to be
desired, it is not the intention of the act to legislate out of existence
automatically all existing ancient non-possessory interests in real
property. Such legislation might not be held constitutional by the
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courts.50 To insure an interpretation by the courts which will
prevent the proposed statute from running into constitutional prob-
lems, its design is that there shall be no necessity that any interest
in real property nmst expire or be destroyed. While substantive
ancient future interests and interests derived from defective execu-
tion and errors in instruments will be extinguished if they do not
appear in the chain of record of title within the specified period of
thirty years preceding the title search (when marketability is to
be determined), the proposed statute provides for the re-recordation
of all such interests in order to preserve them and keep them alive.
Those interests which are re-recorded periodically will continue
in effect, but by requiring their re-recordation to keep them alive
they will always be discoverable upon a reasonably short and routine
title search. If they are not re-recorded, they will cease to exist
and- the land will be freed of their encumbrance. The theory of the
re-recordation provision is comparable to the theories of statutes
of limitations and recordation statutes generally. If one does not
assert his claim or interest within a specified time by re-recording
or re-filing such claim within a time which the legislature specifies,
the interest can never thereafter be asserted. The proposed statute
does not itself arbitrarily wipe out any interest; it affords a means
whereby real and substantial interests in realty can be preserved by
simply re-filing a notice of any claim of interest in order that every
claim of interest of record may be discovered by a title search thirty
years backward.5 If an owner of an interest fails to take the step
of filing the notice as provided, he has only himself to blame if his
interest is extinguished. 52 The proposed statute, in promoting the
public interest that land should be made more freely marketable and
that the status of land titles should be more easily ascertainable,
seeks to "let the dilatoriness of human nature take its toll"5 in
extinguishing interests not seasonably re-recorded.54
"' Such legislation might be held to be an unconstitutional deprivation
of rights under pre-existing contracts or as ex post facto on retroactive
legislation which deprives or extinguishes owners' vested property interests
without due process of law. Compare Biltmore Village v. Rotolante, 71
So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954). But see Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. App.
2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
" Caveat: ancient interests of the United States. See note 39 supra.
" Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 109, 83 N.W.2d 800, 817 (1957).
"' LEACH & LOGAN 77.
" The theory of extinguishing ancient instruments which may hamper
real estate transactions is not new. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-37(5)
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A reading of section 4 of the proposed statute will disclose
another unconventional innovation in a limitation-type statute. The
proposed statute provides that "no disability or lack of knowledge
shall delay the commencement or suspend the running of said 30
year period" within which a notice to preserve a claim of interest
must be filed to prevent its extinguishment. This provision is in
keeping with the previously stated idea that exceptions should not
be permitted in the statute which will emasculate its potential for
bringing about clearer titles.55 While "no disability or lack of
knowledge" will toll the running of the period, provision is made
in the proposed statute that a notice to preserve an interest may be
filed by any person acting on behalf of any claimant who is under
disability, unable to assert a claim on his own behalf or who is
a member of a class whose identity is uncertain and cannot be estab-
lished. This proposed bar of the statute, made applicable to disabled
persons as well as to persons sui juris in the absence of timely re-
recordation of outstanding interests, is based on the belief that the
desirable effects of quieting titles and making their marketability
(Supp. 1963) which provides that as against purchasers for value and
creditors, mortgages, deeds of trust, and other instruments securing the
payment of money are conclusively presumed paid after the expiration of
fifteen years from the date of maturity of such instrument tnless the holder
of such instrument files an affidavit with the register of deeds or makes a
marginal entry on the record in accordance with the statute that payment
has not been made. Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, 98 S.t.2d 481
(1957). For examples of other statutes which absolutely bar the enforce-
ment of mortgages and deeds of trust as against everyone after the expira-
tion of a specified period of time unless an extension memorandum has
been filed to preserve them, see CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 118-5-1 to -2 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 95.28-.29 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1308 (1957);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 11(b) (1956); BURNs IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-623
to -624 (1946); IOwA CODE ANN. § 614.21 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
58-2332 to -2333 (1964); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 33-35 (Supp. 1964);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.691-.692 (1953); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.03
(1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-202 (1956); S.C. CODE § 45-1 (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-212, -214 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-11 to -12
(1957).
"This is the shortcoming of conventional statutes of limitations. Title
searchers cannot rely on the mere passage of time as curative of defects
or as extinguishing existing interests because ordinary statutes of limita-
tions do not run against persons under the disabilities of minority, insanity,
incarceration or against remaindermen until the death of a life tenant.
Likewise, as to such interests as possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry for condition broken, an ordinary statute of limitations can never start
to run under current law until the event or condition happens which will
terminate a pre-existing fee determinable estate or fee simple estate subject
to a condition subsequent. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 222, comments f & g
(1936).
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more easily ascertainable will far outweigh the occasional losses
to persons under legal disability who do not have their claims of
interest re-recorded within the specified time.56 As a matter of fact,
it is likely that most of the interests that will be extinguished by
failure to preserve them by recordation will be those which arise
out of technical, nonsubstantial defects which deserve an early
demise in all events.
D. Mechanics of Filing Notice to Preserve Claims
Section 5. Contents of notice; recording; indexing.-To be ef-
fective and to be entitled to record, such notice shall contain an
accurate and full description of all land affected by such notice,
which description shall be set forth in particular terms and not
be by general reference; but if such claim of interest is founded
upon a recorded instrument, then the description in such notice
may be the same as that contained in the recorded instrument.
Such notice shall also contain the name of any record owner of
the land at the time the notice is filed and a statement of the
claim of interest in the land showing the nature, description and
extent of such claim. The register of deeds of each county shall
accept all such notices presented to him which are duly acknowl-
edged and certified for recordation and shall enter and record
full copies thereof in the same way that deeds and other instru-
ments are recorded, and each register of deeds shall be entitled
to charge the same fees for the recording thereof as are charged
for the recording of deeds. In indexing such notices in his office
each register of deeds shall enter such notices under the grantee
indexes of deeds under the names of persons on whose behalf
such notices are executed and filed and under the grantor indexes
of deeds under the names of the record owners of the possessory
estates in the land to be affected against whom the claim is to be
preserved at the time of the filing.
Section 5 of the proposed act simply sets out the mechanics of
filing the notice to preserve a claim of interest in realty. The notice
must be recorded as deeds and other transactions relating to real
property are recorded in the office of the register of deeds and must
be indexed under the name of the claimant as "grantee" and under
" Compare BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES, §§ 54, 172 (1953) with
reference to the theory of statutes of limitations which bar claims of all
persons whether or not under disability. ". . . [S]ome 25 states place a
maximum period for the bringing of actions by anyone, in the belief that
marketability of land titles should not be forever fettered by exceptions in
favor of the legally disabled." Id. at 263.
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the name of the record owner of the possessory estate as "grantor. '* 7
If re-recorded periodically in the designated place, the claim of
interest will always be discoverable upon a routine title search of
thirty years; if not discoverable on such routine title search because
not re-recorded, the interest will be erased. Section 5 dictates that
the claim of interest be set out with clarity in the re-recordation in
order to be effective.
E. Extension of Time to Prevent Destruction of Interests Already
Thirty Years Old Which Would Otherwise Be Extinguished by
the Statute
Section 6. Extension of time for filing notice of claims which
act would otherwise bar.-If the thirty-year period specified in
this act shall have expired prior to (insert date three years
after the effective date of this act), no interest, claim or charge
shall be barred by section 4 until (insert date three years after
the effective date of this act) and any interest, claim or charge
that would otherwise be barred by section 4 may be preserved
and kept effective by the filing of a notice of claim of interest as
set forth in sections 4 and 5 of this act prior to (insert date
three years after the effective date of this act).
Section 6 of the proposed statute is designed to make its terms
"prospective" as to all claims of interest in lands-to prevent the
proposed statute from automatically "legislating out of existence"
any interest in lands. For instance, the terms of section 4 of the
proposed legislation, if unaccompanied by the saving features of
section 6, would result in the immediate extinguishment of all exist-
ing non-possessory interests over thirty years old which did not
appear in the muniments of title during a title search thirty years
backward. Holders of non-possessory possibilities of reverter,
rights of entry for condition broken, mineral rights, easements or
restrictive covenants recorded more than thirty years before a title
search might have their interests extinguished without the holders
or owners of such interests having any opportunity to preserve
" This is a deviation from the Model Marketable Title Act of Simes
and Taylor. The model act contemplates the existence of a separate book
in the recorder's office to be known as the "Notice Index." See SImEs &
TAYLOR 9. The statutory provision here proposed is to subserve the require-
ments of providing notice under a grantor-grantee form of indexing and at
the same time is designed to prevent the need for the addition of different
kinds of books to which title searchers must refer. It seeks to work the
statute into the present system of land title searches.
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them. If an act automatically destroys an existing vested property
right, it may be held unconstitutional."8 On the other hand legisla-
tion which does not itself extinguish interests in land, but merely
requires notice of their existence to be re-recorded for their preser-
vation, should not be held violative of due process or impairment of
contracts clauses of constitutions. 9 As in the case of the familiar
" Compare Lowe v. Harris, 112 N.C. 472, 482, 17 S.E. 539, 540 (1893)
(quoting 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES 455 (14th ed. 1896)): "A retrospective
statute affecting and changing vested rights is very generally considered in
this country as founded on unconstitutional principles and consequently
inoperative and void." In the Lowe case the North Carolina court quoted
approvingly from the Pennsylvania case of Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & R.
330, 340 (1825):
While acknowledging the right of the law-making power to pass remedial
laws and especially statutes of limitations operating prospectively, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said, "It would be contrary to the spirit
of legislation in Pennsylvania, from the date of its charter to the statute
in question, to deprive a man of his land instantaneously under the
pretense of limiting the period within which he should bring his action."
Booth v. Hairston, 193 N.C. 278, 284, 136 S.E. 879, 882 (1927) states
The Legislature of North Carolina is restrained by Article I, section 10,
of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, section 17, of the
Constitution of North Carolina, not only from passing any law that will
divest land out of one person and vest it in another (except where it is
taken for public purposes after giving just compensation to the owner),
but from enforcing any statute which would enable one person to evade
or avoid the binding force of his contracts with another, whether exe-
cuted or executory ....
See Biltmore Village v. Rotolante, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954) in which
marketable title legislation was held unconstitutional because it arbitrarily
cut off interests without due process of law since it did not afford interest
holders an opportunity to preserve their interests (possibilities of reverter)
from extinction. But see Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. App. 2d 486,
130 N.E.2d 111 (1955) which held that possibilities of reverter are not
estates and are not protected against abolishment or change by legislative
enactment under any constitutional limitation.
" See Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MIcH. L.
REv. 185, 198 (1951):
It is now much too late to inquire whether or not the public interest
served by the recording acts was sufficient to warrant the provisions con-
tained therein . . . . Suffice it to say that our earlier legislators' ob-jective of enabling people to rely upon the ownership as thus indicated
by the record, with a reasonable measure of safety, justified it in their
minds and in the minds of our later eminent students of Constitutional
Law. The device is now one of the key foundation stones of our property
law. The objective of present day legislatures in attempting to clarify
the mass of record title built up by the recording acts is based upon the
same public interest that motivated earlier legislators. When the size
and complexity of the record has grown to a point which defeats the
original purpose of clarity and certainty in land ownership then a resort
to the same device of devestiture may be similarly justified.
Professor Aigler stated that so far as he knew the constitutionality of the
recording acts has never been seriously questioned, although they of neces-
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recording acts, these statutes do not destroy interests and claims
directly; it is the failure on the part of their owners to take the
simple and inexpensive step of preserving them by recording a
notice of their existence that effects the destruction. ° If a reason-
able time is given for compliance, a recording statute which shortens
or limits the time during which a recorded instrument shall con-
tinue to be effective and which provides for renewal of such instru-
ment by re-recording or re-filing is constitutional as to existing
recorded instruments."' To meet the requirement of due process
that police regulations must be reasonable and in order that existing
property interests shall not be automatically extinguished without
affording their owners with opportunity to take the necessary steps
sity operate to destroy property interests. The Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the constitutionality of recordation statutes in Jackson v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 289 (1830):
It is within the undoubted power of the state legislatures to pass record-
ing acts, by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if
the prior deed is not recorded within the limited time; and the power
is the same whether the deed is dated before or after the passage of the
recording act. Though the effect of such law is to render the prior deed
fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law
impairing the obligation of contracts; such too is the power to pass acts
of limitations, and their effect. Reasons of sound policy have led to
the general adoption of laws of both descriptions, and their validity
cannot be questioned. The time and manner of their operation, the
exceptions to them, and the acts from which the time limited shall begin
to run, will generally depend on the sound discretion of the legislature,
according to the nature of the titles, the situation of the country, and the
emergency which leads to their enactment.
" See, e.g., Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, 361, 98 S.E.2d 481,
486 (1957), which held that a 1945 amendment to N.C. GEN. STA. §
45-37(5) (Supp. 1963) was constitutional. The court said: "The power
of the legislature to require recordation or re-recordation of mortgages to
protect the mortgagor's right against claim of purchasers for value has
been consistently recognized." That statute, applicable to pre-existing
mortgages as well as to subsequent mortgages, provided that every existing
mortgage would be conclusively presumed paid after the expiration of fifteen
years from the date of maturity unless a marginal entry or affidavit was
filed in the office of the register of deeds to the effect that the mortgage
debt was, in fact, unpaid. See Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title
Acts, 50 MIcHi. L. REv. 185, 199 (1951).
"The authorities in support of this view are ample. See the excellent
discussions in Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883), and Wichelman v.
Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). See also Conley v. Barton,
260 U.S. 677 (1923); Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90 (1897); Hill v.
Gregory, 64 Ark. 317, 42 S.W. 408 (1897); Rombotis v. Fink, 89 Cal. App.
378, 201 P.2d 588 (1948); Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So. 2d 876 (Fla.
1954); Tesdale v. Hanes, 284 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957); Board of
Educ. v. Miles, 18 App. Div. 2d 87, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1963); Evans v.
Finley, 166 Ore. 227, 111 P.2d 833 (1941). See generally 133 A.L.R.
1318 (1941).
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to preserve them, the proposed statute provides that all persons with
existing interests shall have three years (after the effective date
of the statute) within which they can become acquainted with the
law, its purposes and operation, and take the re-recordation steps
necessary to preserve their interests which would otherwise be
barred by the other provisions of the proposed act. 2 After the
initial three-year saving period, application of the statute will be
completely prospective and there should be no recurring constitu-
tional problem on any theory.
F. Remedy Against Persons Who File False or Fictitious
Claims to Land
Section 7. Filing false claim.-No person shall use the privilege
of filing notices hereunder for the purpose of asserting false or
fictitious claims to land; and in any action relating thereto if
the court shall find that any person has intentionally filed a false
or fictitious claim, the court may award to the prevailing party
all costs incurred by him in such action, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, and in addition thereto may award to the prevailing
party all damages that he may have sustained as a result of the
filing of such notice of claim.
Section 7 of the proposed statute seeks to provide a remedy
against persons who may abuse the privilege of filing notice under
the statute for the purpose of asserting false or fictitious claims to
" The result of this provision will be that land-title searchers will not
be able to rely on the salutary title-cleansing features of the statute until
the expiration of at least three years after its effective date. A shorter
period may be deemed desirable by the legislature. The model act in SIMEs
& TAYLOR 10 provides for a two year extension of the time for re-recordation
where the prescribed period shall have already elapsed at the time the
statute becomes effective. The United States Supreme Court has indicated
that shorter saving periods within which recordation or re-recordation must
be effected will be upheld as constitutionally safe. See Turner v. New York,
168 U.S. 90 (1897) (requiring assertion of rights within six months);
Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 628 (1877) (requiring suit within
nine months and seventeen days). In the latter case the Court said:
In all such cases, the question is one of reasonableness, and we have,
therefore, only to consider whether the time allowed in this statute is,
under all the circumstances, reasonable. Of that the legislature is pri-
marily the judge; and we cannot overrule the decision of that depart-
ment of the government, unless a palpable error has been committed. In
judging of that, we must place ourselves in the position of the legis-
lators, and must measure the time of limitation in the midst of the
circumstances which surrounded them as nearly as possible; for what is
reasonable in a particular case depends upon its particular facts.
Id. at 633.
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the land. The purpose of the statutory provision is to deter the
filing of false claims by allowing a person against whom such claim
is filed to recover of the false filer all costs incurred in an action
relating to such false claim, reasonable attorneys' fees, and other
damages resultant from the false filing.63 The potential sanctions
provided should afford sufficient protection to landowners against
abuses of the act by recordation of unfounded or capricious and
spiteful claims of interest; at the same time the intent of the section
is not to be so harsh as to deter re-recordation of claims by bona
fide claimants.
G. Other Provisions
Section 8. Limitations of actions and recording acts.-Nothing
contained in this act shall be construed to extend the period for
the bringing of an action or for the doing of any other required
act under any statutes of limitations, nor, except as herein spe-
cifically provided, to affect the operation of any statutes govern-
ing the effect of the recording or the failure to record any instru-
ment affecting land.
Section 9. Definitions.-As used in this act
(a) The term "person" denotes singular or plural, natural or
corporate, private or governmental, including the state and
any political subdivision or agency thereof.
(b) The term "title transaction" means any transaction affecting
title to any interest in land, including title by will or descent,
title by tax deed, or by trustee's, referee's, guardian's, ex-
ecutor's, administrator's, or sheriff's deed, contract, lease or
reservation, or decree of any court, as well as warranty deed,
quitclaim deed, or mortgage.
Section 10. Act to be liberally construed.-This act shall be
liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of simplify-
ing and facilitating land-title transactions by allowing persons
to rely on a record chain of title of thirty years as described in
section 2 of this act, subject only to such limitations as appear
in section 3 of this act.
Section 8 of the proposed statute simply provides that nothing
in the statute shall change any of the various statutes of limitations
as This proposed section creates a statutory right comparable to the
common law action called "slander of title." Compare Cardon v. McConnell,
120 N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897). This provision is not advocated in
Simes and Taylor's model act but has been adopted in Michigan, Micn.
STAT. ANN. § 26.1278 (1953), and Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.08
(Supp. 1964).
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establishing periods for bringing actions nor affect the recordation
statutes except as explicitly provided in the proposed statute. In
other words, the proposed act is designed to supplement, not do
away with, currently existing statutes of limitation and recordation
statutes to promote land-title marketability.
Section 9 of the proposed statute sets out the definitions of the
terms used in the act. The definitions of the terms "persons" and
"title transactions" are again designed to forward the idea that
the proposed act is to clear land titles from all types of interests as
against all persons or entities not expressly excepted from its ap-
plication under section 3. The definition of "person" encompasses
not only individuals and corporate entities, but also governmental,
quasi-governmental, and eleemosynary entities; this is for the pur-
pose of making the statutes reliable. The term "title transaction"
is intended to include every legally significant act or transaction
by which rights in land can be acquired. 4
Section 10 sets forth the tenor for construing the proposed act
if adopted: a liberal construction to effect the legislative purpose
of simplifying and facilitating land-title transactions and to increase
the effectiveness of the public records. Coupled with the statement
of purpose of the statute in section 1, this section can be of value
in implementing the statute by lending guidance to interpreting
courts.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
There is a growing consensus that title searches required for the
guaranty and certification of clear and marketable land titles are
beset with too many unnecessary uncertainties and difficulties. The
presently existing "chain of title" system of recordation, designed
to facilitate land transfers and to make title appraisals simple, so
salutary at its inception, is today at least a contributing factor in
the causation of the complexities, delays, and expenses incident to
effective assurance of clear land titles. The recordation statutes
O This includes adverse possession. But see section 3, subsection (c), of
the proposed statute, page 106 supra, that a "title transaction" such as adverse
possession will not be extinguished although there is no recordation of the
adverse possessor's claim if the title holder by adverse possession is in
actual possession of the land at the time marketability of the record title-
holder's title is to be determined. Contra if the title holder by adverse
possession is not in actual possession at the time marketability of the record
title is to be determined.
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provide for the preservation and perpetuation of notice of interests
in land forever-once recorded they continue to exist. When this
basic function of the recordation system is combined with sub-
stantive rules of real property law which permit the creation and
shifting of certain interests in real property without time limitations
beyond which they cannot endure or shift,65 the shortcomings of
the present system of conveyancing become apparent. In order to be
absolutely sure that evidences of such interests do not exist in the
records, title lawyers would be required to check back to the date
land was originally received from the sovereign which is totally
impractical. The adverse possession statutes do not aid title lawyers
in their quest for marketable titles. Where adverse possession is
required to complete a chain of title, it is necessary to produce
factual evidence which is outside of and independent of the land-
title records in order to prove all the elements that are requisite for
obtaining title by adverse possession. Titles by adverse possession
will not become marketable until they have been effectively litigated
and judicially declared to be indefeasible. A title that requires a
quiet title suit to determine its validity is not a marketable title.
In addition, the rules that statutes of limitations do not bar persons
under disability and claimants of future interests impair the ef-
fectiveness of statutes of limitations as title-cleansing devices.
Omissions and errors in the execution and recordation of land-title
instruments are preserved under the current recordation system and
afford the basis for subsequent questions concerning the validity
of titles and their marketability. Quitclaim deeds and waivers of
rights in land must often be sought to eradicate insubstantial interests
in land which serve only to impair their marketability. Suits to
quiet title may have to be instituted. If land deals are not com-
pletely frustrated there are, nevertheless, unwholesome delays and
expenses incident to such title-clearing proceedings. The foregoing
illustrations show the problems inherent in the presently existing
recordation system. There are many other interests in land outside
the ambit of recordation coverage which can also affect the market-
ability of title."' With each successive transfer of land and the
"For instance, easements, mineral rights and rights to profits A prendre
may endure forever once created. Future interests such as possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry for condition broken may be operable to defeat
land titles for generations after their creation in instruments recorded at
a remote time in the past.
6 See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
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passage of time the problems of potential existing interests and
claims of interest, both recorded and unrecorded, are compounded.
With every transfer, the chain of record title is lengthened and the
scope of title search must be increased to assure good, indefeasible,
and marketable titles. The alternative to making such lengthened
complete title searches is to guess; title lawyers must either assume
the risk that there are no outstanding recorded ancient interests or
shift the risk to their purchaser-lender clients. 7
The proposed statute is designed to effect the accomplishment
of surer, more certain land titles by shorter title searches. By
making a title search of the chain of title backward for the specified
number of years (thirty), the title lawyer and his client can know
that all interests in land not appearing in the records (either by
recordation or re-recordation) during the period for which the
title is searched shall be deemed automatically extinquished.0 s Econ-
omy and expediency can be accomplished and at the same time
greater security can be achieved. All interests in land, including
ancient intentionally created interests, non-intentionally created in-
terests which arise by technical errors in the execution and recorda-
tion of instruments, and interests which arise by operation of law
may be extinguished. Non-possessory future interests, easements,
liens, claims arising from omission of spouses' signatures on deeds,
defective deliveries or acknowledgments, and claims arising from
undiscovered heirships, marriage, and numerous other interests will
pass out of existence if their preservation is not effected in accor-
dance with the statutory provisions.
" While title insurance may be procured to provide indemnity for losses
resulting from many land-title hazards, this is often inadequate. A grantee
of land, for example, usually wants the land itself and not money which an
insurance company will pay if his title turns out to be defective. The risk of
losing his land is on the lawyer's client. Furthermore, "marketability" is
not adequately insured by the typical title insurance policy. A non-substantial
defect may not actually defeat a title in whole or in part but its very ex-
istence, often long forgotten, can chill a sale of the land and require a law
suit to remove it as an impediment to marketability. The attendant delays
in clearing the title may not be fully compensable. A typical title insurance
policy of a large title insurance company doing business throughout the
United States provides: "No claim for damages shall arise or be main-
tainable under this policy . . . in the event the title is rejected as unmarket-
able because of a defect, lien or encumbrance not excepted or excluded in
this policy, lontil there has been a final determination by a court of competentjurisdiction ststaining suclh rejection."
" The title searcher must, however, take cognizance of the limited
number of exemptive provisions of the proposed statute. E.g., interests of
the United States are excluded from operation of the statute.
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The statute will provide for an updating and cleansing of the
land-title records and can accomplish a housecleaning function in the
offices of land-title registries everywhere if adopted. In addition to
the legal incidents, the statute can make practicable the periodic re-
tirement of old land records to points requiring little accessibility
because of their diminished legal significance. 9
By reason of the interest-extinguishing features of the pro-
posed statute the number of quiet title suits can logically be ex-
pected to diminish.70  Potential interests which now require the
procurement of quitclaim deeds and waivers or which necessitate
quiet title actions with attendant problems of delay, service of
process, and frequently appointment of guardians will be auto-
matically extinguished by the terms of the statute if their vitality
is not preserved by re-recordation as prescribed. These interests
will no longer require judicial action or quitclaim deeds for their
extinguishment. The statute can thus serve to reduce the number
of annoying, time-consuming, and essentially unproductive pro
forma but expensive quiet-title suits so often necessary to remove
supposed clouds on title arising from errors or omissions in the
execution of instruments or in their recordation. At the same time
it can rid titles of the barnacles on marketability resulting from the
continued existence of antiquated interests, perhaps long forgotten,
which are of small positive value except as deterrents to commerce
in land and its development.
The real estate bar of every state is a conservative and cautious
branch of the legal profession and there is a natural and justifiable
reluctance on their part to lend their support to hasty changes in
the laws relating to property. This proposed statute will not effect
any radical change in the law of real property in any state where it
is adopted. But to effect the salutary results sought to make land
"Ancient records can at least be retired to easily stored microfilm or
other less current, less accessible record books. They cannot, however, be
completely abandoned or destroyed because their retention will be necessary
to evidence claims and interests of the United States not affected by the
statute and as sources of reference as to claims which are to be preserved
by re-recordation under the terms of the statute. In addition, where lands
have not been conveyed for long periods of time they will evidence title no
matter how old they are.
' In Michigan where a marketable title act has been in effect since 1945,
it is reported that fewer suits to quiet title are a consequence of their
marketable title legislation. See Jossman, The Forty Year Marketable Title
Act: A Reappraisal, 37 U. DE'T. L.J. 422, 424 (1960).
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more easily marketable, existing substantive law of real property
need not be changed substantially. In effect the statute is only an
addendum to the existing recording, limitations, and curative stat-
utes, the theories of which have been employed successfully every-
where. Little new law will have to be learned by members of the
real estate bar. Their interests will be subserved by making possible
shorter and surer title searches.
The public will also benefit in that land will be made more
readily marketable with potential savings in time and money for
the completion of title transactions. While some interests will
definitely pass out of existence by reason of the operation of the
statute-this is necessary if it is to accomplish its purpose-persons
who own these interests need not have them extinguished; they
can protect their interests by merely taking advantage of the
statute's re-recordation provisions.
The proposed statute is believed to be a beneficial and remedial
statute. Its adoption can render a service not only to the real estate
bar, but also to the public, which wants its land to be freely and
conveniently alienable. 1'
" That marketable title legislation works in Michigan, see Jossman,
op. cit. supra note 70, at 431:
The act is both a remedial and beneficial statute. It has rendered a
service to the bar and to the public by freeing land titles from ancient
interests which might otherwise be cluttering up attorneys' opinions and
holding up real estate deals. The great majority of Michigan lawyers
are pleased with the statute and are endeavoring to make use of it when
instances arise which call for doing so.
The case of Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) is
a landmark case on marketable title acts setting out their potential for clear-
ing land titles. In that case in which sixty attorneys and law firms filed
briefs as amici curiae, the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld that state's
marketable title act. The court stated:
Such limiting statutes are considered vital to all who are engaged in or
concerned with the conveyance of real property. They proceed upon
the theory that the economic advantages of being able to pass uncluttered
title to land far outweigh any value which the outdated restrictions
may have for the person in whose favor they operate.
Id. at 121, 83 N.W.2d at 825.
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